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ABSTRACT
Is order-flow an important component of private information possessed by traders in government
securities markets? Utilizing a detailed data set on Government of Canada securities auctions, we
argue that the answer is yes. Direct participation in these auctions is limited to government securities
dealers. However, non-dealer customers can also submit bids through dealers. We document patterns
of strategic behavior by both sides of the market, dealers and customers, that support the hypothesis
that customer bids provide valuable order-flow information to dealers. Dealer bids respond to
privately observed customer bids, and dealers observing customer bid can predict the auction cutoff












ssareen@econ.duke.eduA large theoretical literature in ¯nancial economics studies the question of how asset market
equilibrium will be attained when agents possess private information regarding asset values and
make strategic use of this information.1 However, the institutional sources of private information
in some asset markets, especially in the vast markets for government securities, are not easy
to determine. After all, it is di±cult to argue that many participants in government securities
markets are privy to insider information regarding the economic fundamentals underlying the
valuation of a particular Treasury bill or bond. Most, if not all, larger players in these markets
use the same computer screens showing the same ¯nancial and political data and news. Hence,
aside from possessing heterogeneous priors due to exogenous reasons, the forecasts they will make
will di®er from each other only to the extent that their forecasting technologies are di®erent.
There is, however, one source of truly private information, identi¯ed by the market microstruc-
ture literature as \order °ow." Most large players in government securities markets are intermedi-
aries who buy and sell securities to pro¯t from the bid-ask spread. A source of private information
for securities dealers is their interactions with customers. Since each dealer interacts with a di®er-
ent set of customers, each, in e®ect, sees di®erent portions of market demand and supply curves,
leading to di®ering inferences regarding where the equilibrium market price might lie.
In this paper, we will investigate whether and how \order-°ow" information matters in the
Government of Canada securities auction market. In these auctions, securities dealers authorized
by the Bank of Canada place bids on debt issues of the Government of Canada (GoC henceforth).
These securities dealers bid for their own accounts, but they also submit bids on behalf of a set
of quali¯ed bidders (called \customers") who can not place bids directly on the GoC's computer
system, but have to route their bids through a dealer. Hence, \order °ow" in this context can be
de¯ned as the customer bids that a particular dealer sees, but others do not.
The possibility that customer bids provide private information to dealers bidding in Treasury
auctions was ¯rst suggested by the in°uential paper of Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996, page 68).
Our paper provides direct evidence for this observation through a very detailed bidder-level data
set. Similar to other treasury auction data sets used in previous studies, we have access to the
entire set of bids submitted for a set of securities o®erings.2 The unique aspect of our data set
is that we are able to observe which bids are submitted by the dealers for themselves and which
bids are submitted on behalf of their customers. Another unique aspect of our data is that, along
with the ¯nal set of bids, we are also able to track how dealers and customers modify their bids
1See O'Hara (1995) and Brunnermeier (2001) provide comprehensive surveys of this theoretical literature.
2Examples of empirical studies on Treasury auctions that also have access to bidder-level data are Umlauf (1993),
Gordy (1994), Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan (2002), Horta» csu (2002), Fevrier, Preguet and Visser (2002), and
Keloharju, Rydqvist, Nyborg (2004).
2on the Bank of Canada's bid submission database over time.
Given this extremely rich data source, we address the following questions:
1. What is the nature of information °ows in this market? Speci¯cally, do dealers respond to
the information contained in their customers' bids? Do dealers bene¯t from this informa-
tion?
2. One may expect that customers know that they are revealing valuable information to their
dealers, and will react accordingly. Is there any evidence for strategic behavior on the part
of the customers?
To begin answering these questions, we ¯rst describe a feature of the bidding process that
indicates that information °ows are important in determining market outcomes. In Section 2.A
we document that a vast majority of bid submissions are concentrated within the last 10 minutes
preceding the bid submission deadline. Since this is a sealed-bid auction, where bidders can
not see each others' bids, there is no strategic bene¯t to waiting until the last minute, unless
the bidders are waiting for payo®-relevant information to arrive. Moreover, reminiscent of the
information aggregation process noted by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999), we ¯nd that bids that
come in later are less dispersed and much more concentrated around the eventual cut-o® (market
clearing) price of the auction, indicating that later bids are much more informative about the
auction outcome than earlier bids. Throughout, we also note that all of the temporal patterns
we have discovered are much more pronounced in bond auctions compared to T-bill auctions.
This ¯nding is consistent with the intuition that the valuation of long-term securities is subject
to much more uncertainty, and hence the value of waiting for new pieces of information to arrive
is larger.
Next, in section 2.B, we document that dealers submit their own bids seconds after they submit
their customers' bids. This suggests that an important piece of information that the dealers are
\waiting" for is the information contained in their customers' bids. Consistent with the previous
¯nding, the \waiting" behavior of dealers is much more apparent in bond auctions as opposed
to Treasury bill auctions. This once again points out that the value of information provided
by customer orders may be much more important in bond auctions as opposed to Treasury bill
auctions.
An alternative explanation for the \waiting" behavior of dealers is that both customer and
dealer bids re°ect responses to releases of public information that are not observable to us. Thus,
in Section 3.A, we investigate the cross-sectional variation in dealers' bids within a given auc-
tion. We ¯nd that customer bids privately observed by a dealer is an important component of
3the observed variation of bids across dealers participating in a given auction. Furthermore, the
importance of privately observed customer bids in explaining the variation across dealer bids is
more pronounced in bond auctions, as opposed to treasury bill auctions. In the same section,
we also investigate the causes underlying modi¯cations in dealers' bids. We ¯nd, again using
a auction-level ¯xed-e®ects speci¯cation, that the observed modi¯cations in a dealer's bid are
positively correlated with modi¯cations in customer bids observed by that dealer. Once again,
consistent with previous results, the importance of customer bids is more pronounced in bond
auctions, as opposed to treasury bill auctions.
We then examine whether the ability to observe customer bids a®ects dealers' bidding per-
formance. Indeed, in Section 3.B, we report a systematic di®erence across dealers' bidding per-
formances over the sample period: dealers who submit bids on behalf of a larger number of
customers consistently bid closer to the market clearing price of the auction. Since the auction
uses the discriminatory (pay-as-bid) format, bidders have the incentive to bid as close to the
(expected) market clearing price as possible, so as not to leave money-on-the-table to the auc-
tioneer. Our result suggests that dealers who submit bids for a larger number of customers are
more successful in doing this. Consistent with above, we document that the positive correlation
between a dealer's success and the number of customer bids routed by this dealer is much more
pronounced in bond auctions, as opposed to Treasury bill auctions.
Although these ¯ndings suggest that dealers in this market possess an informational advantage
due to their access to customer bids, we still have to consider the alternative possibility that the
dealer might not be the only party who is bene¯tting from the dealer-customer information. That
is, there might be information sharing between the dealer and the customer, in a manner that is
bene¯cial for both.
Therefore, in Section 4, we investigate patterns of strategic behavior by customers. If a
customer does not want a dealer to pro¯t from the information contained in her bid, she might
hold o® her bid until the very last seconds of the auction, so that the dealer will not have the
time to modify her own bid in response. We ¯nd some evidence supporting this hypothesis. In
particular, we ¯nd that a large number of bids that are submitted too late, and are not taken
into account when determining the winners of the auction and their payments, are dealer bids.
Customers occasionally also miss the deadline, but dealers are much more likely to submit bids
after deadline. Moreover, when we calculate what the auction outcome would have been if the late
dealer bid had been taken into account, we ¯nd very large changes in the late dealers' outcomes.
In one striking example, one dealer would have been allocated 398 million dollars more of the
auctioned security had his late bid been taken into account.
4Another pattern we observe in customer bidding behavior is that some customers, especially
those who are buying large amounts, spread their bids among several dealers. As described
in Sections 1 and 4.B, another explanation for this pattern may be the presence of \submission
limits" imposed by the Bank of Canada on bidders to prevent short-squeezes in secondary market.
However, although submission limits a®ect both bond auctions and T-bill auctions, we observe
that customers are much more likely to use multiple dealers in bond auctions, as opposed to
Treasury bill auctions. Combined with the previous evidence that \order-°ow" information is
much more important in bond auctions, this suggests that the use of multiple dealers is indeed a
\strategic" response by customers, employed where it matters the most.
Interestingly, we also ¯nd that a number of large customers do not route their bids through
multiple dealers. In Section 4.C, we report that these customers have formed long-term relation-
ships with their dealers. However, customers in a long-term relationships, as opposed to those
who spread their bids among several dealers, appear to di®er in their bidding behavior. In par-
ticular, they bid prices that are further above the market-clearing price of the auction, compared
to customers who are not in long-term relationships. This might be explained by the fact that
these \long-term relationship" customers have more inelastic demand for government securities
than others. However, we also ¯nd that these \long-term relationship" customers, whenever they
use multiple dealers, submit bids that are closer to the market-clearing price through their long-
term dealer, and submit their higher-price bids through other dealers. Bids that are closer to the
market-clearing price may provide more valuable information to a dealer, hence it is reasonable to
conclude that customers reserve this information for their long-term dealers, who may compensate
them for this information through other means.
Section 5 provides a brief discussion regarding the nature of the information contained in
customer bids. We di®erentiate between two types of information: the ¯rst is \strategic " infor-
mation, that allows a dealer to better assess the competition he faces within the auction. This type
of information can be present in a purely private value world, in which dealers' and customers'
valuations are driven purely by idiosyncratic demand shocks. However, even in a purely private
value world, a dealer can improve her inferences about the competition she faces in the auction
by observing her customer's bid, and hence change her strategic behavior. The second type of
information can be called \valuation " information. In a common value auction environment,
observing a customer bid will enable the dealer to modify, in a Bayesian fashion, her own forecast
of the value of the auctioned security. We argue that our empirical evidence is consistent with
both kinds of information being present in Government of Canada securities auctions.
We believe that our results shed light into the source and aggregation of private information in
5government securities markets, and the formation of customer-dealer relationships as a response
to the exchange of valuable information across these two parties. It also points to one of the
bene¯ts of being a dealer, that of having private access to order °ow information. Of course, as
in any industry with ¯xed costs, some revenues above marginal cost are needed to sustain entry;
hence, one may regard the informational advantage possessed by the dealers as this additional
revenue component.3
Our paper also contributes to prior empirical literature in market microstructure studying the
role of order °ow in various other securities markets. These include foreign exchange markets
(Lyons (2001) and the references within, Evans and Lyons (2002), Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1998)),
equity markets (Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1998)) and option markets (Easley, O'Hara
and Srinivas (1998)). We should note that aside from Hansch, Naik and Viswanathan (1998),
this literature has used aggregate, market-level data to investigate the importance of aggregate
measures of order-°ow and trading activity on asset prices. Hence, our study makes an important
data contribution by focusing on the trading behavior of individual dealers and their customers.
Empirical work that is closest to ours is by Drudi and Massa (2001), who examine the indi-
vidual trading behavior of government securities dealers on the primary (auction) market and the
interdealer exchange, using a detailed ¯xed-income transaction database from Italy. Their stark-
est ¯nding is that dealers behave strategically on the interdealer market to manipulate outcomes
in the auction market. Massa and Simonov (2001) use the same data source to investigate strate-
gic trading in the interdealer exchange, and ¯nd, consistent with our ¯ndings, that information
gained from secondary market trading can a®ect bidding behavior in the primary market. Massa
and Simonov (2003) document that long-term interactions between dealers leads to the formation
of \dealer reputations," which a®ect the informational content that counterparties ascribe to the
trades originating from these dealers.
Our results complement the ¯ndings of Drudi and Massa (2001) and Massa and Simonov
(2001, 2003) in delving deeper into the sources of private information and strategic behavior in
government securities markets, especially in the primary market. Isolating what drives private
information is important in these markets, since theoretical and policy analyses regarding the
design of the auction and surrounding market rules rely very sensitively on the exact speci¯cation
3Aside from setting up the technological infrastructure to participate in these auctions, as discussed in section
1, dealers may be thought of incurring ¯xed costs due to the regulations they need to comply by. For example,
dealers are subject to participation requirements to keep their status, this may be construed as a ¯xed cost of
doing business. Sareen (2002) argues that the dealership system, whereby the issuer makes access to advantages
conditional on the dealers satisfying obligations is a means to resolve the agency problem between the issuer and
the security dealers.
6of the informational and strategic environment (see Binmore and Swierbinski (2003), Sareen (2003)
for recent surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature on the design of Treasury auctions).
I. Description of Data and Surrounding Institutions
The Bank of Canada, on behalf of the Government of Canada (GoC), issues bonds and treasury
bills. Bonds are long-term securities and treasury bills are short-term securities.4 The average
issue size for bonds and treasury bills is 5.5 and 2.4 billion Canadian dollars, respectively. Besides
the large absolute magnitude of the issuance size, government securities are the backbone of the
¯xed-income securities market in Canada. Government securities account for 72% of the ¯xed
income market in Canada.5
The process for issuing a \typical" GoC debt instrument links three markets: the when-
issued market, primary market or the auction, and the secondary market. The process begins
with government securities distributors (dealers henceforth) typically taking short positions in the
when-issued market through forward contracts with other participants, for the yet-to-be auctioned
security.6 Subsequently, dealers attempt to cover these short positions by buying the security from
other dealers in the when-issued market, from the issuer in the primary market, and ¯nally from
another dealer in the secondary market after the auction. In all instances, being pro¯t maximizing
agents, they will attempt to buy the securities in which they have a short position at the cheapest
price. Details of the three markets are given below.
A. Primary Market
Following the when-issued market is the primary market, where the Bank of Canada issues GoC
securities. The auctions are conducted on an electronic system: a bidder communicates his bid
in real-time on a secure electronic system that can be viewed only by the Bank of Canada. The
auctions are sealed-bid auctions.
Potential bidders in the government securities auctions can be classi¯ed into three groups:
primary dealers, other government securities distributors and customers. \Other government
securities distributors" refers to government securities distributors excluding primary dealers. On
4Bonds have a maturity of 30, 10, 5 and 2 years, and treasury bills with a maturity of 1 year, 3 months and 6
months. Treasury bills are zero-coupon bonds.
5The ¯gure reported refers to the amount of securities outstanding that are issued by the Government of Canada
to that issued by all issuers in Canada. Source: pp. 92, Table 16A, BIS Quarterly Review, International Banking
and Financial Market Developments, September 2004, Statistical Annex.
6The Bank of Canada designates certain institutions as distributors of government securities. These institutions
are obligated to buy and sell securities to individual investors.
7an average, 12.7 primary dealers, 4.9 other government securities distributors, and 8.6 customers
participate in an auction. Of these, primary dealers account for as large as 90% of the primary
market in terms of the volume of securities issued.
The distinction between government securities distributors and customers is that the latter
cannot bid on their own account in the auction; rather government securities distributors submit
bids on behalf of customers.7 Thus, Government securities distributors submit bids on their
account and on behalf of the customers, being \bidders" in the former and \submitters" in the
latter case. We see that an average dealer services 0.8 customers in an auction. Customers can
choose to route their bids through more than one dealer in the auction. On an average, a customer
routes bids through 1.5 dealers in an auction. In section 4.B, we will argue that the use of multiple
dealers by customers may be a strategic response by customers who do not want to reveal too
much information to dealers who route their bids.
In general, the maximum amount that a dealer can bid either for himself or his customers, is
based on his past primary market winning share and secondary market trading share, net of his
current holdings of the auctioned security. But the Bank of Canada stipulates that no bidder in
an auction can bid for more than 25% of the issue amount, and no dealer as a \submitter" can
bid for more than 40% of the issue amount whether on his own account or that of his customers.
The distinction between primary dealers and other government securities dealers is based on the
di®erences in their shares of the primary and secondary markets. Thus, while primary dealers
can bid the maximum amount allowed by the Bank of Canada to a "bidder" or a \submitter",
government securities distributors cannot. As an example in Treasury bill auctions, government
securities distributors can bid only a maximum of 10% of the issue amount of an auction net of
their current holdings of the auctioned security.
Bids can be submitted as competitive tenders and noncompetitive tenders.8 Typically, a
participant's competitive tender will comprise of price-quantity pairs, and the participant's net
position of the yet-to-be auctioned security at the point of time the tender is submitted. Net
position at a point in time refers to the participant's net holdings (whether long or short) of
the security being auctioned at that point of time. The net positions really capture the forward
contracts of a dealer with other dealers or customers, prior to the auction. A customer's tender
may comprise only price-quantity pairs as a customer has the option of submitting his net positions
directly to the Bank of Canada instead of communicating it through the tender(s) he submits
7Government securities distributors do not charge a fee to route customer bids.
8A noncompetitive tender comprises a quantity subject to an upper bound of $3 million, with a participant being
allowed to submit a single noncompetitive tender.
8through dealers. Participants can revise or cancel previously submitted tenders prior to the
auction deadline; there are no limits on the number of revisions that an auction participant can
make.
All tenders have to submitted before the expiry of the bidding deadline. Tenders submitted
after the bid submission deadline are cancelled unless they are on account of transmission fail-
ure. After the expiry of the bid submission deadline, submitted tenders are allotted through a
discriminatory price auction. The awards are announced 15 minutes after the bid submission
deadline, with the announcement including the cuto® price, the amount issued, the quantity
weighted average price, and the low and high yields.
Our data set captures several aspects of the primary market. For the primary market we have
data over the period October 1998 to March 2003. A security will be uniquely identi¯ed by its
maturity date and coupon rate if it is a bond, and by a maturity date if it is a treasury bill. An
auction will refer to the issuance of a security of a speci¯c maturity range (30, 10, 5, 2 years for
bonds and 1 year, 6 months, 3 months for treasury bills), held at a speci¯c time; thus, an auction
for a security will be uniquely identi¯ed by the maturity range and the date on which it is held.
We have 347 treasury-bill auction and 66 bond auctions in our sample. For each auction in
the sample, we have the issue amount; issue date and maturity date of the auctioned security;
total amount bid; total amount allotted; cuto® yield; total bid amount at the cuto® yield; coupon
rate (if the security is a bond).
Several bidders participate in each auction, and each bidder can submit more than one ten-
der in an auction. For each tender submitted in an auction, we have the following information:
tender type (competitive or noncompetitive); time-stamp of the tender indicating the time at
which the tender was submitted in the auction; tender status, indicating whether the tender was
submitted by the participant, cancelled by the participant, or rejected by the issuer;9 identity of
the submitter of the tender; identity of the bidder of the tender; participant type of the bidder
(primary dealer, other government securities distributor, customer, Bank of Canada) and submit-
ter (primary dealer, other government securities distributor); net position amount indicating a
9Tenders received before the auction deadline will have a status of \submitted" or \cancelled". tender. A
participant can cancel his last submitted tender. No bid level information is available for cancelled tenders. Tenders
received after the auction deadline will have a status of \pending submission" or \pending cancellation". These
tenders will either be accepted or rejected by the issuer, with a tender beyond the auction deadline usually being
accepted by the issuer if it is on account of transmission failure, and rejected otherwise. The former if accepted
has a status of \submitted", and the latter if accepted has the status of \cancelled". All rejected tenders have the
status of \rejected".
9participant's net holdings of the yet-to-be auctioned security at that time;1011 the allotted tenders
of each bidder.
Finally, for each tender submitted in an auction by a bidder, we have the bid amount and
yield pairs; the maximum amount a participant can bid as a \submitter", and as a \bidder"; and
the amount allotted to each participant.
In addition to describing the data in terms of auction-tender-bid level, we also distinguish
the o±cial vs history aspect of the data. As mentioned before, a bidder can revise a submitted
tender before the auction deadline. All tender revisions and the constituent bid level revisions,
made by each participant in the auction will be referred to as the history of the auction. For
each auction participant, the unique tender and the constituent bids in this tender that are used
to determine the cuto® yield and the allotment of the auctioned security is referred to as o±cial
data.12 Thus, the o±cial data is a subset of the history data. While several empirical studies
of treasury auctions have used o±cial data, this is the ¯rst paper that makes use of the history
aspect of treasury data to make inferences about the strategic environment under which bidding
takes place in these auctions.
B. \When-Issued" and Secondary Markets
Recall that the when-issued market precedes the auction by a week. Participants engage in forward
trading for the yet-to-be auctioned security in the when-issued market. Also, the primary market
is followed by trading in an active resale market for the \new issue" called the secondary market.
Both the when-issued and the secondary markets comprise the resale market for Government
of Canada securities. The resale market can be decomposed into two: the customer-dealer market
and the interdealer market. In 2002, the customer-dealer market accounted for 54% of the total
volume traded of Government of Canada bonds, and the interdealer market accounted for the
rest.
In the customer-dealer market, institutional investors (for example, pension funds, mutual
funds) trade with dealers on a bilateral over-the-counter basis over the telephone, with the result
10A net position has to reported with a revised tender only if the change in the net position since the last
submitted tender exceeds $25 million.
11Customers can submit their net positions to the issuer instead of revealing them to the dealer when submitting
their tenders through them. This has to be done 30 minutes before the auction deadline unless there is a change
in the net position by $25 million, in which case the latest net position reported is recorded. For customers who
submit net positions directly to the issuer, only the last net position amount reported by a customer before the
auction deadline is available; the history of revisions in the net position is not available.
12An o±cial tender is the last submitted or cancelled tender of a participant.
10of these transactions known only to the two counterparties participating in the transaction. Un-
fortunately, we do not have real-time quote or trade data for this part of the market, thus we can
not observe the over-the-counter customer-dealer market directly. However, we do observe this
market indirectly through the net positions that bidders report when they submit tenders in the
primary market.
This is in contrast to the interdealer market that operates primarily through electronic in-
terdealer brokers. Electronic interdealear brokers post on an electronic screen, bid, o®ers, and
trade outcomes communicated to him by the dealers.13 In 2002, 86% of the interdealer market
was brokered through these electronic interdealer brokers. Only dealers can post quotes or trade
through the interdealer brokers. However, both customers and dealers have viewing access to
the electronic screens of an interdealer broker via CanPX, a data service that consolidates and
disseminates the trade and quote information provided by the electronic interdealer brokers.14
We have access to transactions level data from CanPX, allowing us to observe trade and quote
activity in real-time in the interdealer market over the period July 4, 2001 to September 10, 2001,
and February 25, 2002 to February 27, 2003. This would, at least in principle, allow us to track
activity on the when-issued and secondary market for an auctioned security.
To our initial surprise, when we looked at CanPX data to investigate interdealer trading
patterns in the when-issued market for a one-week window prior to the auction, we observed no
trade or quote activity for the yet-to-be-auctioned security during the entire set of security issues
covered by our sample. We should note that Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) found a very similar
lack of liquidity in the U.S. when-issued interdealer market in the period prior to the auction.
Our ¯nding that no when-issued trades are observable on CanPX was, at ¯rst, puzzling, given
that the basis for a \when-issued" market is price discovery. However, we subsequently discovered
that there is indeed an active market for \when-issued" trading, as evidenced from our observation
of the levels and changes in the declared net positions of the bidders. Yet, none of this trading
shows up on CanPX, and appears to be conducted exclusively on the over-the-counter market.
Since transactions on the over-the-counter market are bilateral, and are not, to our knowledge,
publicly observable, this ¯nding appears to be consistent with the intuition of Bikhchandani
et al. (1994), Simon (1994), and Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) that pre-auction when-issued
transactions carry important informational content that dealers do not want to share with other
market participants.
13Typically, the identity of the dealer is not revealed.
14Prior to the establishment of CanPX, only dealers could observe the trade and quote activity on the electronic
interdealer-broker screens.
11II. Customer Order Flow and Dealers' Bidding Behavior
In this section, we examine bidding patterns in the data to investigate whether dealers respond
to, and make pro¯table use of information contained in customer bids that they observe. We
¯rst document a salient temporal pattern in this market: bids come in during the very last
minutes of the auction. This suggests that bidders are waiting for important information to
arrive. This is re°ected in the \quality" of the bids that come late { these bids are much more
concentrated around the market clearing price of the auction. We then document that dealer bids
follow customer bids. This suggests that the information that dealers are waiting for is in their
customers' bids. Next, we provide more direct evidence for the hypothesis that dealers utilize
the information contained in their customers bids, by showing that dealers modify their bids in
response to modi¯cations in their customers' bids. Finally, we show that dealers who route bids
for a larger number of customers are systematically more successful in their bidding.
A. Temporal Patterns in Bidding
Bank of Canada securities auctions have a ¯xed bid submission deadline, and bidders are allowed
to submit bids for a particular auction two weeks ahead of time. Since our data set includes the
time stamps for each tender (o±cial or not) submitted by the dealers, we can analyze the timing
of o±cial bid submissions.
In Figure 1, we plot the cumulative distribution function of o±cial bid submission times for
di®erent subsamples of our data set. First, observe that bidding activity is very much concentrated
within the hour before the submission deadline. Ninety percent of all competitive bids, those that
specify a price as well as a quantity, are submitted in the last 20 minutes of the submission
deadline. In contrast, observe that non-competitive bids, i.e. those that do not specify a price,
tend to come much earlier than competitive bids. The median competitive bid comes in 7.9
minutes before the deadline, whereas the median non-competitive bids comes in 26.5 minutes
before the deadline.
One explanation for the last-minute concentration of bids is that, especially for competitive
bids, new information is very important in forming expectations about the appropriate value of
the security being auctioned. Hence, bidders are reluctant to commit to a price bid until they are
certain that no new information will be released.15
15The explanation for last-minute can not be pure \procrastination" by dealers, since we observe some dealers
submitting both competitive and non-competitive bid in a given auction, where the non-competitive bid is submitted
earlier than the competitive bid.
12Note that the phenomenon we are reporting is similar to the \sniping", or \last minute bid-
ding" phenomenon that has been documented in the context of Internet auctions by Roth and
Ockenfels (2002) and Bajari and Horta» csu (2003). Internet auctions are open-ascending auctions
where bidders can see and respond to each others bids; this creates several strategic reasons for
\sniping." Although Bank of Canada securities auctions are sealed bid auctions in which dealers
do not observe and can not respond to other dealers' bidding activity, dealers can observe and
respond to the bidding activity of customers who route bids through them, and have the incentive
to wait for these bids to arrive.
An observation that is consistent with the \waiting for new information" hypothesis is the
di®erence between the bid submission times for long-term vs. short-term securities seen in Figure
1. The submission timings for long-term securities are much more concentrated at the very last
minutes of the auction, with the median o±cial bid for securities with maturity greater than one
year coming 2.5 minutes before the auction deadline, as opposed to 9.3 minutes for securities
with maturities less than or equal to one year. Pricing longer maturity securities depends quite
sensitively on expectations about the future, and since many more factors enter into forming
expectations about the long-term rather than the short-term, one may expect bidding decisions
to be more responsive to arrival of new information.
We now bolster the information gathering hypothesis by presenting evidence that later bids
are less dispersed, and, in particular, tend to be much more clustered around the eventual market
clearing price of the auction than early bids. To do this, we ¯rst categorized o±cial bids in
every auction by their submission times by dividing time into 5 minute periods leading up to the
deadline. Since bids come in the form of multiple price-quantity pairs, i.e. demand schedules, we







We then calculated the absolute di®erence between each quantity weighted average price bid and
the cuto® price of the auction, i.e. lowest price at which the securities were sold. We then average
these absolute deviations across each bid in a given submission period. Hence, what we are
constructing is a measure of the dispersion (in absolute deviation terms) of the bids that arrive
in di®erent periods.16 Moreover, the dispersion is calculated around the cuto® price, hence the
measure of dispersion can be interpreted as a \quality" indicator. Since Bank of Canada securities





















c), which would mechanically decline with Kt.
13auctions follow the discriminatory (pay-your-bid) pricing format, bidders have an incentive to bid
prices that are as close to the cuto® price as possible.17 Alternatively, one can view the cuto®
price as re°ecting a weighted average of bids submitted by the bidders.
Figure 2 plots, as an average over all auctions in our data set, both the number of bids received
in each 5 minute time interval, and the closeness of these bids to the eventual cuto® price, as
measured by the dispersion of the bids around the cuto® price. Observe ¯rst that, consistent
with the discussion above, many more bids arrive late than early. Observe also that the average
absolute prediction error of bids declines from 15 cents at the 30 minute mark to 2.5 cents within
the last 5 minutes. Thus early bids are, on average, quite far from the equilibrium market clearing
price.
In Figure 3, we conduct a similar analysis separately for bond auctions and T-bill auctions.
In this ¯gure, we take the absolute prediction error of bids that come within the last 5 minutes
as the base case, and report the relative size of the absolute prediction errors of bids that come
in other time periods.18 Observe that this ratio is constant around 1 for short-term securities
auctions, suggesting that earlier bids are as good predictors of the auction outcome as later bids.
In contrast, for longer term securities, bids that come in earlier than 30 minutes before the auction
deadline have absolute prediction errors that are 10 times as large as bids that come within the
last 10 minutes of the submissions process.
This last set of results supports the hypothesis that the late submission of bids re°ects an im-
portant information gathering process, and that this process is more important for bond auctions
than for T-bill auctions.
B. Dealer Bids Follow Customer Bids
We now argue that one piece of information that dealers may be waiting for is the information
contained in their customers' bids. Table 1 displays evidence supporting the hypothesis that
dealers submit their own bids after seeing customers' bids. To construct this table, we looked at
all instances in which a dealer submitted own her own behalf as well as for a number of customers.
We then compared the submission time of the latest customer bid to the submission time of
the dealer's own bid using a pairwise t-test (i.e. the within dealer di®erence). The test, when
conducted for the entire spectrum of maturities, reveals that dealer bids lag the latest customer
17If the cuto® price was known to the bidders, all of them would submit bids that are equal to the cuto® price.
Of course, in reality, bidders do not know the cuto® price and have to balance the risk of paying too much vs. not
winning the auction.






5mins¡pcj for each time period t, where the ratio is equal to 1 for t = 5 minutes.
14bid by 0.43 minutes, the di®erence being statistically signi¯cant at the 1.7% level. Furthermore,
we ¯nd that dealer bids lag customer bids 55% of the time.
However, as the next column of Table 1 shows, the di®erence in the timing between dealer and
customer bids do not appear to statistically di®erent for Treasury bills. Dealer bids lag customer
bids 52% of the time { not visibly (or, as it appears, statistically) di®erent from an even split.
In contrast, dealer bids appear to lag customer bids much more visibly in auctions for longer-
term securities. Not only both customer and dealer appear to come much later for these auctions;
dealer bids, on average, are submitted 2.5 minutes later than the latest customer bid. The lag
is statistically signi¯cant at the 1% level. Moreover, dealer bids lag customer bids 74.9% of the
time in these auctions.
Hence, the evidence suggests that dealers react to the information contained in their customers'
bids when and where it matters. In particular, the second and third columns of Table 1 con¯rm
our ¯ndings so far regarding the di®erence in the importance of \customer information" across
longer term vs. shorter term securities auctions. Given that customer bids also come very near the
bid submission deadline, one may suspect that dealers will have little time to perform elaborate
calculations. However, our data suggests that, on average, a minute or two appears to su±ce.
III. Do Dealer Bids Re°ect The Informational Content of Cus-
tomer Bids?
Do dealers utilize the information contained in their customers' bids? We try to answer this
question in two ways.
A. Do Customer Bids Drive Di®erences in Dealer Bid Levels and Dealer Bid
Modi¯cations?
We ¯rst investigate whether the cross-sectional variation in dealer bids within a given auction can
be explained by the customer bids seen by each dealer. Under the null hypothesis that customer
bids do not provide valuable private information to a dealer, we should expect di®erences across
two dealers' bids within a given auction to be independent of the customer bids each receives.
Note that examining within auction variation across dealer bids is crucial. Dealer bids may
respond to public as well as private information °ows; thus variation in dealer bids across auc-
tions may re°ect unobserved variation in public information °ows as well as variation in private
information °ows. We will control for the impact of public information °ows by including auction
15level ¯xed e®ects in our regressions.19
Another piece of private information possessed by each dealer is their net position. Recall that
dealers are actively involved in the (over-the-counter) when-issued market before the auction,
accumulating signi¯cant short or long positions of the security that is about to be sold. One
can also interpret the when-issued market activities of the dealers as a component of the private
order °ow information possessed by the dealers, since, as noted in Section 1, these activities are
conducted on the over-the-counter market, which is not a transparent market. As also noted
above, however, these net positions have to be reported to the Bank of Canada, hence we use this
information in our regressions.
Thus, the regression equation we will estimate is:
DealerBidit = ¯1CustBidit + ¯2NetPosit + °i + ut + "it
where t indexes auctions in our data set, i indexes dealers within an auction. The dependent
variable, DealerBidit, is Dealer i's quantity-weighted price bid in auction i. CustBidit is Dealer i's
customer's bid (averaged over di®erent customers if Dealer i submits bids for multiple customers).
NetPosit is Dealer i's declared net position in auction t, normalized by C$ 100 million. In many
speci¯cations, we also include a dealer ¯xed-e®ect term, °i, to control for di®erences across the
bidding patterns of di®erent dealers that do not vary from auction-to-auction (note that, in
contrast, \order °ow" information possessed by a dealer varies from auction to auction).
19An alternative method to control for public information °ows is to use proxy variables generated from secondary
data sources. We should note, however, that most central banks, including Bank of Canada, set auction deadline
timing so that it does not coincide with major news releases like monetary policy target or income and employment
data. However, it is possible that other sources of ¯nancial news, such as developments in U.S. ¯nancial markets,
may a®ect asset prices in Canada. One could, in principle, use real-time trading prices on the \when-issued"
market, or prices of securities that might be close substitutes to the security being auctioned. As noted in Section
1.B, however, the one data source one might expect to be most helpful in this regard, CanPX, is conspicuously
silent during the period preceding the auction. As described in Section 1.B, we observed no interdealer trading
activity for the security about to be auctioned. We did observe some trading activity in other securities during
the period preceding the auction. However, our conversations with experienced GoC securities traders pointed
out several problems with treating these securities as close substitutes. The traded securities either had very
di®erent maturities, or had very di®erent coupon structures. Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) also note the problems
attached to using yield-curve based valuation benchmarks. Even in the cases where there was a maturity and
cash-°ow structure match, the auctioned security was a benchmark and the security trading on CanPX was a
non-benchmark issue, and hence not comparable due to the liquidity premium attached to the benchmark issue.
For the U.S. Treasury market, Fleming (2001, 2002) has documented that liquidity of on-the-run (\benchmark" in
the Canadian context) issues di®er signi¯cantly from that of o®-the-run (\non-benchmark") issues, with the price
of the on-the-run issues embedding a premium for liquidity.
16In the above speci¯cation, the auction ¯xed-e®ect, ut, serves to capture unobservable changes
in dealer bids that are common to all dealers' participating in the auction, presumably due to
public information °ows. We also conduct our analysis on Treasury bills and bonds separately to
relax the assumption that the linear relationships in this speci¯cation are constant across di®erent
types of securities auctions in our data.
The results of the above regression are reported in Table 2. We ¯rst report the results of the
regressions without dealer ¯xed-e®ects. The ¯rst coe±cient estimate in Column (1) of the table
shows that one cent increase in customers' bids is associated with a 0.6 cent increase in a dealer's
own bid. This estimate is highly statistically signi¯cant. Note also that the net position of the
dealer enters very signi¯cantly into the regression. The coe±cient estimates indicate that a 100
million Canadian dollar increase in a dealer's short position is correlated with a bid that is 0.4
cents higher than average, i.e. dealers with short positions bid more aggressively. One explanation
for this might be that dealers taking on large short positions are wary of being squeezed in the
resale market, and consequently bid more aggressively.20
Columns (2) and (3) of this table replicate the same regressions on the subsamples of T-bill
and bond auctions, respectively. Note that the correlation between dealer and customer bids is
0.62 for bonds, as opposed to 0.16 for T-bills, which, consistent with the results in the previous
section, suggests that customer bids are more in°uential drivers of dealer bids in bond auctions.
In Columns (4)-(6), we run the same regressions with dealer-level ¯xed e®ects added into the
speci¯cation. Some dealers may systematically bid higher than others due to di®erences in their
demand for the security; dealer ¯xed-e®ects attempt to capture such unobserved drivers of dealer
demand. Indeed, the R2's of the regressions indicate that dealer ¯xed e®ects capture a lot of
the variation in the bids. However, the correlations between customer bids and dealer bids still
remain at very similar levels, indicating that the estimated dealer response to customer bids is
not attributable to unobserved systematic di®erences across dealers.
20This ¯nding appears to be consistent with the theoretical results of Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) who analyze
a strategic model of short squeezes in discriminatory auctions. In the equilibria they analyze, dealers with a short
position bid more aggressively than dealers without a forward position to avoid a squeeze in the resale market.
Interestingly, their results also indicate that dealers who have long positions also bid more aggressively. Intuitively,
this arises from the fact that dealers who are long have the incentive to create and therefore pro¯t from a squeeze;
but they can only do this if they outbid some of the shorts. To further investigate this intriguing theoretical result,
we ran the regressions in Table 2 by introducing long and short positions separately into the speci¯cation, and
obtained that both short and long positions lead to more aggressive bidding. However, our results indicated that
dealers who are short bid much more aggressively than dealers with comparably-sized long positions { thus the
overall negative coe±cient reported in Table 2. We should note that Nyborg and Strebulaev's results also suggest
that shorts should be expected to bid much more aggressively than longs.
17We can conclude from these results that there is a robust statistical dependence between
dealer and customer bid levels, and that this can explain some of the variation in dealer bids
within a given auction. We now strengthen this ¯nding of correlation in bid levels by looking
at bid changes. I.e. we investigate whether dealers change their bids in response to the arrival
of customer bids, and whether the direction and magnitude of this change is explained by the
informational content of the customer order.
To do this, we utilize the bid history aspect of our data set, which comprises of all bids
submitted by the dealers, not just the o±cial bids. This allows us to track the modi¯cations that
dealers make in their bids on Bank of Canada's computerized bidding system.
To calculate modi¯cations in dealers' bids, we ¯x a time interval, starting T = 10 or T = 30
minutes prior to the bid submission deadline, until the submission deadline. We then calculate
the \standing bid" of the dealer at time T, which is the dealer's most recent bid as of time T.
However, the dealer can change this bid until the bid submission deadline. Thus, we ¯nd the
dealer's \o±cial" bid, i.e. the ¯nal bid by the dealer that is accepted by the Bank of Canada.
We then calculate the annualized basis point di®erence between the dealer's o±cial bid, and her
standing bid at T minutes prior to the deadline. Since bids comprise of multiple price-quantity
points, we take the quantity-weighted average price as the bid.
We then perform the same calculation for the customers, taking the annualized di®erence
between their o±cial bid and their standing bids at T minutes prior to the bid submission deadline.
Thus, the change in a dealer's information set between time T and the auction deadline includes
these modi¯cations in customer bids.21
The dealer's information set also contains changes to his net position. Since, by law, dealers
have to report changes in their net long or short positions to the Bank of Canada along with
any changes to their bids, we observe net impact of this trading activity through modi¯cations
to the dealers positions. Again, we code these modi¯cations as the di®erence between a dealer's
\standing" net position at T minutes prior to the deadline, and the net position reported along
with the dealer's o±cial bid.
Table 3 reports the results of the regression of modi¯cations in dealer bids on modi¯cations
in customer bids that the dealer observes. The dependent variable in this table is the change in
a dealer's bid during the last 10 or 30 minutes of an auction. Note that in both time intervals,
modi¯cations in customer bids are positively correlated with modi¯cations in dealer bids. For
21Note that the dealer may choose not to change her bid in response to a modi¯cation in her customer's bid.
This choice also has information about how dealers respond to customer bids. Hence, our data speci¯cation also
includes those instances where the dealer does not change her bid in response to a customer bid modi¯cation.
18the entire sample of auctions, the estimates indicate that a 1 cent increase in a customer's bid
translates into a 0.261 cent increase in the dealer's bid, if the change comes within the last 10
minutes. The response is somewhat less if the change comes within the last 30 minutes, and
indicates a 0.135 cent upward revision of the dealer bid in response to a 1 cent increase in the
customer's bid. Note that from columns (2),(3),(5) and (6), we see that the correlation is much
more pronounced for bond auctions as opposed to T-bill auctions.
Another interesting result of this regression is that dealer bids respond asymmetrically to
changes in net position that come early vs. late. This we see from the reversal of the sign on the
dealer's net position variable across T = 10 and T = 30. We do not have a very good explanation
for this ¯nding, but one possibility is that the types of when-issued orders that a dealer receives
early in the bidding process are from a di®erent set of clientele than those who put in their when-
issued orders late in the bidding period. If we reconcile these results with the bid level regressions
in Table 2, however, we get the implication that most of the net position information is obtained
by the dealer earlier in the bidding period, and that changes within the last 10 minutes are rare
events, which appears to be the pattern in our data.
Overall, the results of this section indicate that customer bids are important drivers of the
variation across dealers' bids. We now investigate whether the information provided by customer
bids is useful for the dealers in terms of their bidding performance.
B. Dealer Pro¯tability and Access to Customer Information
Having established in the previous section that dealer bids re°ect the order°ow information of their
customers, we would expect that dealers who observe \more" order°ow predict the cuto® price
more accurately. We ¯nd that this is indeed the case with dealers who submit bids on behalf
of a larger number of customers consistently bidding closer to the cuto® price at the auction.
Moreover this greater accuracy in prediction appears to translate into higher ex post pro¯ts for
dealers who submit bids for a larger number of customers, since these dealers are able to to win
the auction more often, but do not appear to pay more for the units they win.
Figure 4 compares the bidding patterns of three classes of bidders: customers, dealers who
route customer bids, and dealers who do not route customer bids. In this ¯gure, we plot the
distribution of the di®erence of quantity-weighted price bids from the cuto®-price. Since we plot
the distribution for the entire set of bids in our data, which encompasses securities of a wide






, which converts the price di®erences reported in the data
19into the (negative) basis point di®erence of the annual yields implied by the prices.22
As is apparent from the ¯gure, there are stark di®erences across these three classes of bidders.
Customers appear to bid the highest, followed by dealers who see customer bids. Dealers who do
not see customer bids appear to bid the lowest prices. Indeed, the density of bids submitted by
dealers who see customers appears to sandwiched between the density of customer bids and the
density of bids of dealers without customers { suggesting that dealers who see customer bids use
a combination of the \prior" information possessed by all dealers, and the \private" information
given by customer bids. Moreover, from this ¯gure, it appears that dealers who observe customer
bids are able to place bids that have a tighter spread around the cuto® price of the auction than
dealers who do not observe customer bids. In particular, dealers who observe customer bids
appear to \underbid" less, and consequently win the auction more often.23
We now investigate the prediction performance of the dealers using a regression framework.
To do this, we grouped auctions into their respective maturity classes, and averaged each dealer's
absolute prediction error (calculated as the absolute di®erence between her quantity-weighted
average price bid and the cuto® price in the auction) across all auctions she participated in within
this maturity class.
In Table 4, we regress this average prediction error measure on dealer characteristics, control-
ling for maturity class ¯xed e®ects. The ¯rst dealer characteristic we focus on is the number of
customers served by the dealer over the auctions within the maturity class. The second dealer
characteristic is the \size" of a dealer's operations, calculated as the (log) average size of the
quantity bids placed by the dealer for its own account across the auctions within a maturity class.
Table 4 reports a robust negative correlation between the number of customers served by a
dealer and the dealer's prediction error. This correlation appears robust across di®erent subsam-
ples in the data. The point estimate from the ¯rst column implies that each additional customer
22The formula is based on a conversion of the prices in our bid data into the implied prices of a 360 day zero
coupon bond with the equivalent yield. To see this, suppose we have a zero coupon bond with face value PM paid
out M days from now. Then, if we see a bid of Pbid for this bond, the daily, continuous compounding discount rate
of the bidder, rbid, implied by this price can be solved from the formula: Pbid = PMe
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cutoff = ¡360(rbid¡rcutoff), the (negative) di®erence in the implied
annual zero-coupon bond yields. Since the magnitudes of this di®erence are on the order of one-one-hundredth of
a percent, i.e. \basis points," we scale up by 10000 to get a (negative) basis point equivalent.
23Similar patterns were observable when we plotted the corresponding bid distributions for bond and bill auctions.
20served by a dealer is correlated with price bids that are 7.7 cents closer to the cuto® price. In-
terestingly, however, we ¯nd a positive correlation between the dealer's size and the absolute
deviation from the cut-o® price.
In the second column, we interact the two independent variables with an indicator for T-
bill auctions (hence the base case estimates are for bond auctions). We see that the negative
correlation between the number of customers served and the absolute deviation of a dealer's bid
from the cut-o® price is much stronger for bond auctions. That is, the marginal e®ect of a
customer on a dealer's bidding performance is much larger for bond auctions than T-bill auctions.
This ¯nding is consistent with our earlier ¯ndings, and the hypothesis that customer information
is more valuable in bond auctions than in T-bill auctions. However, also interestingly, the positive
correlation between dealer size and absolute bid deviation is larger for bond auctions (in fact the
coe±cient on size for T-bill auctions is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero).
In the third column, we use a di®erent interaction term: we look at the di®erence between the
performance drivers of primary dealers and non-primary dealers. It appears that the marginal
impact of a customer is not signi¯cantly di®erent for a non-primary dealer when compared to a
primary dealer (though the coe±cient is negative). It also appears that the anomalous positive
correlation between dealer size and absolute bid deviation is driven mostly by non-primary dealers.
Going across the table, we see that the positive correlation between number of customers
served and the prediction performance of a dealer appears to be larger for bond auctions than for
bill auctions.
The next set of results reported in the table replicate the three regressions for two alternative
measures of dealer bidding performance. The ¯rst measure we utilize is the di®erence between the
dealer's (quantity-weighted average price) bid and the cuto® price in auctions where the dealer
bids above the cuto® price, i.e. this is a measure of the amount of \overbidding." 24 We note that
the correlation and explanatory power of the independent variables is low for this performance
measure (none of the estimated coe±cients appear statistically or economically signi¯cant. The
reported R2 also includes maturity ¯xed e®ects, hence the reported magnitude is due to these
variables).
The second measure we utilize is the di®erence between the dealer's bid and the cuto® price
in auctions where the dealer bids below the cuto® price, i.e. a measure of the amount of \under-
bidding." The results of the three regressions using this dependent variable are very similar to
those when we used absolute deviations as the measure of bidding performance.
Consistent with the patterns in Figure 4, these last two sets of results indicate that customer
24We set this variable equal to zero when the dealer bids below the cuto® price.
21information aids the dealer mostly through reducing the amount the dealer \underbids" in the
auction. Since, by underbidding, the dealer wins a lower quantity of the securities she was
demanding, this result suggests that customer information allows dealers to win more frequently.
\Overbidding," on the other hand, indicates how much a dealer pays over the market-clearing
price for the quantity of securities he wins. Thus, our results show that dealers who serve a larger
number of customers consistently win a large fraction of the securities they were demanding, and
do not consistently overpay for the units they win. If dealers have similar willingness-to-pay for
the securities, this would indicate that dealers who see a larger number of customers are more
pro¯table ex-post.
IV. Customers Respond to Dealer's Use of Order-Flow Informa-
tion
In the previous sections, by looking at the dealer-side of the primary market, we found considerable
support for the hypothesis that an important source of private information for dealers is customer
bids, and that dealers use customer bids to revise their opinion about where the cuto® price in
the auction might be. In this section we present evidence to support this hypothesis from the
customer side of the primary market. Customers realize that dealers revise their opinion about
where the cuto® price will be, on the basis of customer bids. We investigate three hypotheses
regarding how customers may react strategically to dealers' use of their information.
In section 4.A, we investigate the hypothesis that by holding-o® bid submission till just before
the auction deadline, customers can try to prevent dealers from making use of their order °ow
information. Since a dealer wants to condition on as much customer information as possible,
customers may try to push a dealer \beyond the deadline" by submitting their bids at the last
minute, and forcing the dealer to risk submitting his own bid later than the deadline.25 In
Section 4.B, customers attempt to conceal their entire demand schedule from a single dealer by
using multiple dealers to submit bids. In Section 4.C we show that some customers are in a
long-term relationship with a dealer in that they use a distinct dealer to submit their bids across
all auctions. Presumably these repeated interactions provide dealers with valuable information
about the cuto® price in the auction, for which they are likely to compensate the customers. We
¯nd that the payo® to the customer takes the form of the customer paying a lower price for the
securities at the auction when he submits bids through his long-term dealer compared with other
dealers. Finally, in parallel with the di®erence in the \information gathering" hypothesis between
25This strategy hinges crucially on the fact that dealers are obligated by law to route customer bids immediately.
22bonds and treasury bills in Section 2, we ¯nd that the strategic responses of the customer to bid
revision by the dealer are much more pronounced in bond auctions compared with treasury bill
auctions.
A. Last Minute Bidding by Customers Leads to Late Bids by Dealers
In Section 2.B we observe that while customer bids lag dealer bids, customer bids come quite close
to the submission deadline as well. A possible reason for this could be that customers attempt
to conceal their demand curves from dealers as long as they can, as they realize that dealers will
use these to revise their own bids. Moreover, since dealers are under legal obligation to route
customer bids as soon as they receive them, customers may try to bid very close to the deadline
in order not to leave enough time for dealers to send in their own, revised bids.
We now look at late tenders in our data set to investigate the plausibility of this hypothesis.
Throughout, late bids will refer to bids that were rejected by the issuer for being submitted
after the submission deadline26. We found that 2% of the o±cial bids submitted by the dealers
were late. However, the fact that we see so few late tenders does not necessarily contradict our
hypothesis that customers bid close to the auction deadline to conceal their demand curve from
dealers. This is because a customer knows that a bid that she submits too close to the submission
deadline has a higher likelihood of not being transmitted by the electronic auction system, as the
dealer through whom this bid has been submitted may have hit his maximum submission limit.27
In this instance bidding too close to the submission deadline would mean that the customer does
not participate in the auction, either. If she has a large order, which is when she will attempt
to bid as late as possible, the consequence of not participating can be particularly severe as this
customer could be potentially \squeezed" in the secondary market.
Evidence that is more in line with the hypothesis that customers bid close to the auction dead-
line to prevent dealers from revising their bids emerges, when we look at the bidders from whom
the late bids originate, and the auctions where the late bids are submitted. In case customers bid
close to the bid submission deadline to prevent dealers from revising their bids on seeing customer
bids, we should ¯nd that most of the late bids are dealer bids. We ¯nd that this is the case. 77%
26In few instances, a bid that comes after the submission deadline is accepted as an o±cial bid in case it is due
to a genuine transmission error.
27As described in Section 1, dealers can not submit bids for more than 40% of the total issue net of the dealer's
long position. When a dealer submits a bid on behalf of a customer on the electronic auction system, and including
this bid the dealer has bid in excess of the amount he is permitted as a submitter, the auction system automatically
does not transmit this bid and °ashes this message on the dealer's screen. Since these bids are not entered in the
auction system, they are not recorded, and we could not analyze them.
23of the late tenders were submitted by the primary dealers and 13% by the customers.28
Do these late bids a®ect the auction outcome? If customer bids indeed provide valuable
information to the dealers, then we should expect that if the late bids of dealers were accepted
rather than rejected, the auction outcome would be di®erent, in a manner that is more pro¯table
to the dealer. To examine the manner in which the auction outcome changes, we calculated the
counterfactual auction cuto® price and the resulting allocation had the late bids been accepted.
Notice that a late bid would a®ect the cuto® price or the allocation only if it is marginal or
inframarginal. We found that the late bid had an impact on the auction outcome in 111 auctions
where a late bid was received. However, these late bids had very little e®ect on the revenue of
the seller { taking the late bids into account, the issuer would have received, on average, only
an additional 767 Canadian dollars per auction!29 This is also borne out by the fact that the
quantity weighted average price is really unchanged between the real auction and the reallocated
auction.30
These last set of ¯ndings imply that the late bids, when successful, are right at the margin, and
end up displacing other marginal bids (if the late bids had been at the top end of the aggregate
bid curve, i.e. if they had been inframarginal, we would have expected larger changes in revenue
and quantity-weighted average price). Moreover, within each of these 111 auctions, we ¯nd that
there is a large amount of redistribution of the allocated securities. On average three dealers
are a®ected in an auction, with the number of bidders who win more units in the reallocated
auction being almost equal to those who win less. In the auction where we observe the maximum
redistribution with the inclusion of late bids, one primary dealer ends up winning 398 million
Canadian dollars more of the auctioned security! Of course, this reallocation would have come
at the expense of other dealers { had this late bid been accepted in this auction, 3 other dealers
would have each won 100 million dollars less of the security.
Finally, late bidding should be more pronounced for bond auctions rather than treasury bill
auctions as there is greater uncertainty in pricing the former, and hence the tendency by customers
to conceal their bids till the end should be more pronounced for bond auctions than treasury bill
auctions. This is supported by the data as well. We ¯nd that the proportion of late tenders
in bond auctions is more than double that in treasury bill auctions.31 In addition late tenders
28The di®erence is statistically signi¯cant at the 99% level with the test statistic, Z=7.9.
29this amount is also not statistically signi¯cant with Z=0.0002.
30The change in price, averaged across the 111 late auctions is 0.004 cents, and Z=1.2.
31For bonds, late tenders as a proportion of the number of auctions in the sample was 0.64; for treasury bills the
corresponding proportion was 0.31. The di®erence is signi¯cant at 99% with the test statistic, Z=4.3.
24were submitted in twice as many bond auctions compared with treasury bill auctions.32 If the
value of order°ow information is greater in bond compared with treasury bill auctions as we have
hypothesized, then we should ¯nd that the di®erence in the amount paid by the bidders when the
status of the late tenders is changed from rejected to accepted is signi¯cantly greater for bond
rather than treasury bill. We ¯nd this to be the case with the former being thrice the latter.33
B. Customers Use Multiple Dealers
In this section we document another possible strategic response by customers to dealer's using the
information contained in customer bids submitted through them. Table 5 reports a breakdown
of the customers by the average number of dealers they utilize per auction. Speci¯cally, for each
customer in our sample, we obtain the average number of dealers through whom she routes his
bids in an auction; the average is across the auctions in which the customer participates (we do
this separately for bond and T-bill auctions).34 If this average is less than 1.5, we de¯ne this
customer as a \single-submitter" customer who he uses one dealer to route bids in most but not
all auctions in the sample. If this average is 1.5 or more, then we classify this customer as a
\multiple-submitter" customer.
Table 5 indicates that while \single-submitter" customers are in the majority, 24 (26 in bond
auctions) customers in our sample use multiple dealers.35 We now investigate why multiple-
submitters are utilized. A ¯rst hypothesis is that a customer who needs to purchase a large
amount of securities at the auction routes his bid through more than one dealer. Column (1)
of Table 6 reports the regression of the number of submitters utilized by a customer on the
proportion of this customer's bid amount to the total issue amount in the auction. Customers
use an additional dealer to submit tenders for a 36% increase in the ratio of bid amount to issue
amount.
One possible reason for customers using multiple dealers when they wish to purchase a large
amount of the auctioned securities could be due to what we shall call the \bid concealing" e®ect.
32Late tenders were submitted in 50% of the bond auctions in the sample, and only 25% of the treasury bill
auctions. The di®erence was signi¯cant at 99% with the test statistic, Z=3.4.
33The di®erence is signi¯cant at the 95% level.
34The number calculated here is not the average number of unique dealers utilized by the customer over the
sample. This is analyzed in the Section 4.C.
35We should note that 82% of the \single submitter" customers participated in less than 20% of the auctions in
our data set, and can be regarded as \passive" customers; while only 48% of the \multiple submitter" customers
can be regarded as being \passive." So, the relevant breakdown within \active" customers is that 13 distinct
customers are \multiple submitters," whereas 17 distinct customers are \single-submitters," i.e. the fraction of
active customers who are multiple submitters is much higher.
25When a customer has a large quantity of security to buy and is routing his bid through a single
dealer, he is in fact revealing a much larger proportion of the market demand to the dealer,
compared to when he has a smaller quantity to buy. This suggests that a customer could be
routing his bids through several dealers when he has a large amount to buy, precisely because he
wants to conceal his full demand schedule from a single dealer. Routing bids through more than
one dealer is simply a customer's strategic response to a dealer who will use her customers' bid
information to her own strategic advantage.
The following test lends considerable support to the \bid concealing" hypothesis. The test
is based on a comparative static that exploits the di®erences in the temporal bidding patterns
established for the dealer-side of the market in the previous sections. Our results in previous
sections suggested that customer information played a more important role for bond auctions
compared with treasury bill auctions. This e®ect should also a®ect customers' behavior: the
tendency to use a larger number of dealers in response to quantity demanded should be much
more pronounced for bonds than treasury bills.
To perform this test, we rerun the regression in Column (1), Table 6 by interacting the ratio
of bid amount to issue amount with an indicator for bond auctions. Results in Column (2), Table
6 show that this is the case. For bond auctions, customers use an additional dealer to submit
tenders for a smaller increase in the ratio of bid amount to issue amount compared with treasury
bill auctions, and the di®erence is statistically signi¯cant.36 But this result could also suggest that
customers demand is higher in bonds relative to treasury bills, and therefore it is the \submission
limit" e®ect that leads them to submit bids through multiple dealers. We ¯nd the reverse: the
ratio of bid amount to issue amount is 10% higher for treasury bills than bonds, and this di®erence
is statistically signi¯cant.
There is, however, a second compelling reason for why customers might route bids through
several dealers, or why the slope coe±cient in the regression in Table 6 Column (1) has a positive
sign. Customers could be routing bids through several dealers to circumvent a dealer's \submis-
sion" limit. As we explained in Section 1, a dealer is subject to a maximum constraint on the
amount he can submit for customers in an auction. Thus, when customers have a large quan-
tity of security to buy, they will tend to use multiple dealers due to the \submission limit" of a
dealer. Clearly, unlike the \concealing e®ect", there is nothing strategic in this e®ect. Rather,
dealers routing their bids through multiple submitters might simply be a quirk of the Canadian
36For bond auctions, the regression estimates mean that customers use an additional dealer to submit tenders
for a 24% increase in the ratio of bid amount to issue amount, and for treasury bill auctions they use an additional
dealer for a 40% increase in the ratio of the bid amount to issue amount.
26mechanism for selling government securities.
There is, however, a second piece of evidence in our data that suggests that the submission
limit can not fully account for the use of multiple dealers. In particular, we ¯nd that the use of
multiple dealers is a strategy that is not employed by all customers in our data.
However, if the "submission limit" e®ect was indeed the only driving reason to using multiple
dealers to submit one's bids through, then controlling for the quantity demanded by the customer,
we should ¯nd that the slope coe±cient of our regression in Table 6, Column (1) should not be
statistically di®erent between \single-submitter" and \multiple-submitter customers," as de¯ned
in Table 5. Recall that the slope measures the average change in the number of submitters used
by a customer due to a change in the amount demanded by this customer in an auction scaled
by the issue amount in that auction. We actually ¯nd the reverse. We re-run the regression in
Column (1) of Table 6 by interacting the ratio of bid amount to issue amount with a dummy that
equals 1 if the tender is submitted by a multiple-submitter customer, and zero otherwise. The
sample consists of o±cial tenders of customers in auctions where they use two or more dealers as
submitters. Column (3), Table 6 reports the results of this regression. While multiple-submitter
customers use an additional submitter for a 55% increase in the proportion of bid amount to issue
amount, single-submitter customers actually decrease the number of submitters with an increase
in the proportion of bid amount to issue amount, with the di®erence being statistically signi¯cant
at the 99% level.
These results lead us to conjecture that while single-submitter customers route bids through
an additional dealer when the dealer hits his \submission" limit constraint, multiple-submitter
customers route bids through several dealers due to both the \submission limit" e®ect and the
\concealing e®ect".
Thus, all customers will tend to route bids through more than one dealer when they have a
large amount of security they wish to purchase at an auction. The existence of single-submitter
customers shows that it is the \submission limit" imposed on a dealer as a submitter that is at
work. But the existence of multiple-submitter customers shows that there is a strategic e®ect at
work as well: using multiple submitters could be a customer's best response to a dealer making
strategic use of this customer's order °ow information.
C. Customers in Long Term Dealer Relationships
If customers use multiple dealers to conceal their demand schedules from customers, why do we
not see the single-submitter customers doing the same? After all they too know that dealers
through whom they submit bids, revise their own bids on observing their customer bids. We ¯nd
27that some of the single-submitter customers are in long-term relationship with their dealers.
To show the existence of a long-term relationship, we want to show that single-submitter
customers submit a large proportion of their bids through a distinct submitter throughout the
sample. Thus we are going to concentrate on customers in row 1, Table 5; these customers are
single-submitter customers.37 However Table 5 does not indicate that when on an average one
submitter was used, whether that submitter was kept the same across auctions. Hence, for each
of the single-submitter customers, we construct the ratio of number of auctions in which a speci¯c
submitter was used, to the total number of auctions in which the customer participated, for
each distinct submitter used by a single-submitter customer. This is referred to as a customer's
submitter proportion. For each customer, we tested if the highest and second-highest submitter
proportion is signi¯cantly di®erent. Customers for whom this is the case are customers with
long-term relationship with a speci¯c dealer in that they submit most of their tenders in the
sample period through a distinct dealer. Table 7 lists the 7 customers for whom the fraction of
bids that they route through their favorite dealer is signi¯cantly di®erent from the fraction they
route through their second favorite dealer. For example, customer A is a single-submitter active
customer who has a long-term relationship with dealer 1 in treasury-bill auctions. Customer
A participates in 25% of the treasury bill auctions held in the sample period. In 78% of these
treasury-bill auctions in which customer A participates, she uses dealer 1 as the submitter.
Having established the existence of long-term dealer relationships, we now explore what kind
of payo®s a customer gets from being in this long-term relationship with a dealer. We test three
hypothesis about whether the average price paid by a customer di®ers depending on whether a
customer is in a long-term dealer relationship or not.
The ¯rst hypothesis we test is whether a customer pays a lower price when she submits tenders
through the dealer with whom she is in a long-term relationship, compared with the dealers with
whom she is not in a long term relationship. Table 8, columns (1)-(3) report the results of these
tests. The sample for testing this hypothesis comprises of winning bids of only those customers
who are in a long term relationship, only in the sectors (T-bills or bonds) where there is a long
term relationship. These tenders could be submitted either through the dealer with whom the
customer is in a long term relationship, or through the dealer with whom the customer is not in a
long term relationship. For each winning tender of the a customer in an auction,38 we construct
the quantity weighted average price paid on the units won. We then calculate the di®erence in
37As noted in the previous section, not all of these single-submitter customers are active participants { in fact
82% participated in less than 20% of the auctions. When we eliminate these \passive" customers, we ended up
with 17 distinct active \single-submitter" customers in our sample.
38A customer has the option of submitting his tenders through more than one dealer.
28quantity weighted average price and the cuto® price of the auction. This is our dependent variable.
For the regression in Column (1), Table 8, the explanatory variable is an indicator variable \Use
long-term dealer" that takes the value 1 if the tender allotted to the customer was submitted
through the dealer with whom he is in a long-term relationship, and 0 if it is submitted through
any other dealer. Customers in a long-term relationship pay 0.5 cents less when they submit
tenders through their long-term dealer compared with other dealers, with this di®erence being
signi¯cant at the 89% level.
The sample that we have used in this regression has two kinds of auctions. In the ¯rst set of
auctions, customers who are in long-term relationship route bids only through the dealers with
whom they are in a long-term relationship. In the second set of auctions, customers who are in
a long-term relationship route bids through both the dealer with whom they are in a long-term
relationship, and other dealers. Given the \submission" limit e®ect, it could well be that the
second set of auctions are really high demand auctions. But then the negative coe±cient of the
long-term dealer variable in Column (1), Table 8 could well be the result of this: the higher price
paid when the bid is routed through a dealer other than the long-term dealer is because the need
to go to other dealers arises only in auctions where demand is high.
Our results in columns (2)-(3), Table 8 rule out this concern. In column (2), Table 8 we
introduce an indicator variable \Use multiple dealers" that takes value 1 for auctions in which
the customer is submitting tenders through both the dealer with whom he is in a long-term
relationship, and through other dealers. Presumably these are high-demand auctions, where the
customer's long-term dealer has hit a submission limit. The variable takes a value zero for all
other auctions in the sample; presumably these are low-demand auctions. We now re-run the
regression in Column (2), Table 8 introducing this indicator variable as well as interacting it with
the dummy variable for the use of a long-term dealer.
The ¯rst thing to note is that auctions where both the long-term dealer and other dealer
are being used are indeed high demand auctions. The average price paid in these auctions is 3
cents higher compared with auctions in which the customers route bids only through the dealer
with whom they are in a long-term relationship; the di®erence is also statistically signi¯cant at
the 99% level. However, this appears to make no di®erence to the payo® hypothesis. Customers
pay 1 cent less when they route bids through the dealer with whom they are in a long-term
relationship, whether or not the auction is a high-demand auction or a low-demand auction.39
But note that the di®erence in the average price paid increases from 0.5 cents when we do not
39We ¯nd a di®erence of 0.1 cents between high-demand and low-demand auctions. But the coe±cient on the
interaction of the bond auction indicator and the indicator for the use of a long term dealer is not signi¯cant.
29control for high-demand, low-demand auctions, to 1 cent when we control for the high-demand,
low-demand auctions.
We have established the di®erences in bidding patterns between treasury bill and bond auctions
for the dealer-side of the market in the previous sections. These results suggest that the payo®
to a customer for being in a long-term relationship with a dealer should be much more in bond
auctions compared with treasury bill auctions. We do not ¯nd this to be the case. In Column
(3), Table 8, we de¯ne an additional indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the long-term
relationship is in the bond sector, and zero if the long-term relationship is in the treasury bill
sector. The regression in column (2), Table 8 is re-run taking into account the sectoral di®erence.
We ¯nd that the coe±cient on the interaction term is not statistically signi¯cant; the di®erence
in the average price paid by the customer when he routes his bid through the dealer with whom
he is in a long-term relationship compared with other dealers, does not vary across the sectors in
which there is long-term relationship. These results hold when we control for between-customer
di®erences in the quantity weighted average price and cuto® price between customers, irrespective
of whether they submit tenders through long-term dealers or other dealers.40 But we do ¯nd that
the customers who are in a long-term relationship in the treasury bill sector are being compensated
by their dealer in the bond sector. When they participate in the bond auction, these customers
pay 9 cents less when they route bids through the dealer with whom they are in a long-term
relationship in the treasury bill sector!41 This cross-sectoral compensation supports the bond-bill
bidding patterns reported in the paper so far.
The second pay-o® hypothesis we test is whether a customer in a long-term dealer relationship
pays a lower price compared with customers who are not in long-term dealer relationship, in the
maturity sector where the customer is in a long-term relationship. Table 8, columns (4) and (5),
report the results of this test. The sample to test this hypothesis is built as follows. From the
previous sample, we remove all tenders submitted by the customer through the dealer with whom
he is not in a long-term relationship. This gives us allotted tenders of customers who are in long-
term relationship, submitted through the dealer with whom they are in long-term relationship, in
the sector in which the customer is in a long-term relationship. We add allotted tenders submitted
by customers who are not in a long-term relationship in treasury bill and bond auctions. These
customers either use more than one submitter in an auction (multiple-submitter customers with a
submitter proportion greater than 1), or they use one submitter in an auction, but this submitter
40This is done by re-running the regression in column(2), Table 8 after adding a dummy variable for each of the
customers listed in Table 7 to the set of explanatory variables in column (3), Table 8.
41This di®erence is signi¯cant at the 90%level; t=-1.49, t(25, 0.90)=1.32.
30is not a distinct submitter.
Column (4) reports the results of the regression of the di®erence of quantity weighted average
price and the cuto® price on the long-term dealer indicator. 42 In the sector where there is a
long-term relationship, customers in long-term relationship when submitting tenders through the
dealer with whom they are in long-term relationship, pay 0.5 cents more than customers who
are not in long-term dealer relationship, and this di®erence is signi¯cant at the 99% level.43 In
Column (5), Table 8 we run the same regression, but now introducing the distinction between
treasury bills and bond auctions. In both the treasury bill and bond sector, customers in long-
term relationship when they submit tenders through the dealer with whom they are in long-term
relationship, pay more compared with customers who are not in long-term relationship. For bonds
(treasury bills), the former pay 6 (5) cents more than the latter, and this di®erence is statistically
signi¯cant.
This result appears counterintuitive at ¯rst in that customers in long-term relationship pay a
higher price for Government of Canada securities when submitting tenders through the long-term
dealer, compared with customers who are not in a long-term relationship. What might explain
this result? Given the fact that the long-term customer and his dealer interact with each other in
sectors other than Government of Canada securities, it is conceivable that the payo®s to the long-
term customers are being given in these sectors by the long-term dealer. The second hypothesis
tested above suggests that this could be the case. Alternatively, it is conceivable that a customer
enters a long-term relationship with a dealer because institutional reasons speci¯c to a customer's
business push him to the inelastic part of his demand curve relative to customers who are not in
a long-term relationship.44
Thus, customers who are in a long-term relationship with a dealer, are adequately compensated
by the dealer for the information provided by the customers in repeated interactions.
42The constant in the regression in column (3) is the di®erence in the quantity weighted average price and cuto®
price of the customers who are not in a long-term relationship.
43t = 2:72, P(t > 2:72) = 0:997.
44For example, a customer that is a pension fund could be legally required to hold a certain proportion of its
portfolio in the form of Government of Canada securities. This may not be the case for another customer that is a
hedge fund.
31V. Discussion: What is the information contained in customer
bids?
The empirical results presented so far support the hypothesis that the ability to see customer
bids provides an informational advantage to dealers. But what is the nature of the information
being revealed by the customer to the dealer? As we shall argue now, part of the answer to this
question depends on whether the auction environment is one with idiosyncratic \private values,"
or one where all bidders possess a \common value."
Although the \common value" assumption is standard in the literature on securities auctions,
even a simple independent private values environment can also generate many of the empirical
patterns seen in the data. In the Appendix, we provide a simple model based on a private
value single-unit ¯rst-price auction framework to support this claim. In the model considered in
the Appendix, the strategic uncertainty faced by a dealer is the distribution of the bids of her
opponents. The dealer's optimization problem is to ¯nd the lowest bid that will allow her to
win the auction with high enough probability. Seeing customers' bids allows a dealer to re¯ne
her beliefs about the distribution of competing bids (since customers are also competitors), and
this allows the dealer to make a more pro¯table decision. Thus, in a private values setting, the
information contained in customer bids is \strategic" information, that allows the dealer to form
a better response against the competition she faces.
As an example, consider the simplest case where there is a single unit of the security being
sold, and the customer is the dealer's only competitor in the auction. In this case, seeing the
customer's bid will allow the dealer to bid a very small increment above the customer to win the
auction in instances where winning is desirable for the dealer. The model in the Appendix shows
that this very simple intuition persists when there are other dealers that the informed dealer
is competing against. The model also clari¯es the manner in which the distribution of surplus
is skewed towards the \informed" dealers who see customer bids, and away from customers and
\uninformed" dealers. The model also provides a rationale for the late-bidding behavior displayed
by customers, and hence the dealers' incentive to want to wait until the last seconds of the auction
to update their bids.
The fact that a strictly private value model can generate several of the predictions does not
mean that the presence of a common component in bidder valuations is ruled out, however. The
same strategic motives seen in the private values setting are also present in a common value
auction. However, in a common value auction, a dealer gains an additional bene¯t from seeing
her customers' bids. Along with the reduction in competitive uncertainty, the dealer can re¯ne
32her estimate of the liquidation value of the security by incorporating the information contained
in customers' bids into her expected value calculation. We can call this \valuation" information
component of customer bids, as distinct from the \strategic" information.
Based on our empirical results, we can not rule out the hypothesis that customer bids carry
\valuation" information; hence the presence of a common value element along with a strictly
private values environment. What we can conclude from ¯ndings, however, is that customer bids
provide \strategic" information to dealers, since this e®ect is present in both a private value
environment, and a common value environment.
VI. Conclusion
An important conclusion of this paper is that in Government of Canada securities auctions, where
direct access is restricted to authorized security dealers, \order-°ow" information is an important
source of private information for these security dealers. \Order-°ow" information is revealed to a
security dealer through his interactions with customers, who can place bids in the auctions only
through the authorized security dealer.
What if this source of private information was \dissipated" through a change in the mechanism
to issue government securities? This could happen either by allowing direct access to customers
to place bids in the primary issuance, and/or imposing some form of transparency obligations
on the authorized security dealers with respect to their secondary market activity. For example,
in Italy, the secondary market is transparent in that it is a centralized, regulated electronic
screen-based market. However, only authorized dealers are allowed to place bids in primary
issuance, and as we point out in the Introduction, Drudi and Massa (2001) show how authorized
dealers use the discrepancy in transparency to obtain government securities in the less transparent
primary market at below-market prices. In the U.S., customers are allowed to place bids in
the primary issuance, making the primary market transparent. But unlike Italy, the secondary
market is largely over-the-counter, with the customer-dealer interaction protocol requiring the
customer to even reveal his intention to buy or sell when he requests a quote! The Italian and
the U.S. comparison, along with several other countries examined by Sareen (2003), highlight
that a mechanism for issuing government securities appears to retain privacy of a security dealer's
\order-°ow" in at least one the markets in which the dealer is participating. Which one will be
less costly for the issuer? Which one will increase participation in the primary issuance? These
questions will be explored in future research.
33VII. APPENDIX: A Simple Private Value Model of the Dealer-
Customer Interaction
We will now try to characterize the informational advantage possessed by a dealer who can see
her customers' bids. The main feature of the following stylized model is that the dealer gains
information from her customers regarding the competition she is facing in the auction, and can
update her bid accordingly.
We should note that this model is built entirely around a symmetric, independent private value
framework. In a common value framework, there would be an additional informational advantage
to observing a customer's bid { the dealer could alleviate her winner's curse by combining her
own private information and the informative content of her customer. Modelling the strategic
interaction in a common value environment fully is much more di±cult. Therefore, we will restrict
attention to the private values environment. Note, however, that the private value environment
is able to generate many interesting predictions that we see in the data.
We will start by analyzing the simplest possible example where there is a single dealer and
single customer in the auction, and where both of these agents have symmetric independent
private valuations for the auctioned security. The only twist in this model is the fact that the
dealer can observe the customer's bid. We will demonstrate, as we found in our empirical results
in Section 3.B of the paper, that the dealer bene¯ts from this arrangement, in that she is able to
earn higher pro¯ts compared to the situation where she does not observe her customer's bid, and
has to compete with her in a \blind" fashion. The result also has a policy implication: we show
that this dealer-customer arrangement is costly to the auctioneer, in that expected revenues are
lower. The revenue loss is also accompanied by an e±ciency loss.
The second example we examine, however, shows that the revenue loss prediction is not robust
(though the e±ciency loss prediction is). In this example, we introduce a second dealer to the
model, with the twist that this dealer does not have a customer whose bid she can observe
(however, the bid of this dealer is not observed by the other dealer). In this example, we can
once again match our empirical result in Section 3.B: the \advantaged" dealer with the customer
is once again the most pro¯table party, followed by the non-advantaged dealer, and ¯nally by the
customer. However, the auctioneer's revenue actually increases in this example.
The third and ¯nal example we consider shows how this simple model can match the temporal
patterns in bidding described in Section 2. Here, we allow the customer to wait until the last
seconds of the auction to submit her bid through her dealer. This opens up the possibility that the
dealer can not submit her updated bid in time. We show in this situation that the \advantaged"
34dealer will place the symmetric Nash equilibrium bid as an insurance bid, but will update her bid
once the customer's bid arrives, and hope that the updated bid will go through.
A. One Dealer, One Customer
The simplest possible setting is one where there are two bidders, the dealer;D, and her customer,
C; who are competing for a single unit of the security. Both the dealer and the customer have
symmetric, independent private values drawn iid from the uniform [0;1] distribution. Call the
customer's valuation vc and her corresponding bid, bc. Similarly, call the dealer's valuation vd and
her corresponding bid bd. The unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game when
the dealer does not observe the customer's bid is bd(v) = bc(v) = v
2.
When the dealer can see the customer's bid, however, the dealer will bid bd = bc +" whenever
vd > bc, where " is a small increment to outbid the customer. If vd < bc the dealer knows he does
not want to win, so he can place any undominated bid (i.e. any bid below vd).
Knowing the dealer's strategy, the customer's best response problem is to maximize:
max
bc
(vc ¡ bc)Pr(bc > vd)
since the customer only wins the auction when bc > vd. Taking the ¯rst-order condition, we
get bc = vc
2 , i.e. the customer's strategy is the same as in the case where the dealer does not
bene¯t from the customer.
Let us now see how the asymmetry between the dealer and the customer a®ects the revenues
to the auctioneer. In the case where valuations are uniform [0;1], the expected revenue from the
¯rst-price auction without the dealer advantage is 1
3, the expected value of the second highest
valuation (by the revenue equivalence theorem).
When the dealer has the advantage, however, the auctioneer's revenue is E[vC
2 ], since the
winning bid will always equal vC
2 (disregarding the ", which can be arbitrarily small). But with
uniform [0;1] valuations, the expected revenue will be 1
4, i.e. the auctioneer loses revenue from
requiring customers to bid through dealers!
Moreover, the informational advantage given to the dealer introduces an allocational ine±-
ciency. E±ciency requires that the good be allocated to the agent with the highest valuation.
However, with the dealer-customer arrangement, there exists cases where b¤
C < vD < vC i.e. cases
where the dealer wins the auction even though the customer has the higher valuation.
35B. Two dealers and One Customer
We now consider a slightly more complicated setting: suppose, in addition to the dealer and
customer, there is another dealer in this auction, A, but this dealer does not have a customer.
Let va be the (iid) valuation draw of this dealer, and ba her corresponding bid.
In this case, D faces some uncertainty regarding her chances of winning the auction even upon
seeing the bid of C, since she still has to outbid A. Therefore, D's expected pro¯t from winning
the auction, upon seeing bc is:
max
bd
(vd ¡ bd)Pr(bd > bajbd > bc) if vd > bc (2)
We now assume that A follows a linear strategy, ba = ®va (we will verify this assumption later
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and any bid bd · vd if vd < bc.
The optimal bidding problem of the customer is:
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which is the Bayesian Nash strategy with 3 symmetric bidders.
Finally, A's optimal bidding problem is given by:
max
ba




























which is once again the Bayesian Nash strategy with 3 symmetric bidders. Notice that in this
last step, we did not impose the linearity of A's bid function, hence we have veri¯ed the linearity
assumption made in the earlier steps.
The fact that the customer C and customer-less dealer A have the same bidding strategies
may appear counterintuitive at ¯rst; however, these strategies are not outcome equivalent (since
D acts upon C's bid). Moreover, it appears that D bene¯ts the most from this arrangement. A
and C are at a disadvantage compared to the setting with 3 symmetric bidders, with C being the
most disadvantaged party. In particular, our Monte Carlo simulations (with 1,000,000 draws of
iid bidder valuations) show that D wins the auction 45% of the time, A wins the auction 33%
of the time, and C wins the auction 22% of the time (instead of each winning with probability
1
3). D's expected pro¯t is 0.0868 compared to 0.0833 in the symmetric case, A's pro¯t is 0.0810,
and C's pro¯t is 0.056. Interestingly, the auctioneer appears to gain from this arrangement in
terms of revenues: the expected revenue is 0.5089, compared to 0.5 in the 3 symmetric bidders
case. However, this revenue gain is a result of an e±ciency loss, which happens when D wins the
auction in instances where C had the highest valuation.
C. Why Might Customers Want to Delay Their Bids?
Now consider the possibility that the dealer does not always have time to utilize the information
in customer bids to update her own bids. This could happen is customers wait until the last
seconds of the auction to send in their bids. Since the dealer is under legal obligation to route
through customer bids, there might not be enough time for the dealer to send her own updated
bids through.
To formalize this intuition, let us revisit the simple case with one dealer and one customer
considered above, and let [T ¡ ¢;T];¢ > 0 denote the "last time interval" before the close of
the auction at time T. Suppose any bid transmitted within this time interval is accepted by the
BoC system with probability p < 1. In this situation, a customer has the incentive to submit her
bid exactly at time T ¡ ¢. At this point, the dealer can try to submit an updated bid, which is
accepted with probability p. However, just in case this bid is not accepted, the dealer can also
37place a bid anytime before T ¡ ¢. Without any customer information, however, this bid will be
equal to the symmetric Bayesian Nash strategy of the dealer, i.e. bd =
vd
2 .
Thus, with probability 1 ¡ p, the auction outcome will be determined by the symmetric ¯rst-
price auction strategies, and with probability p, the outcome will be the same as in the case
considered in section B above. Notice that this same logic applies to the 2 dealer, 1 customer
model considered above { once again, the "advantaged" dealer can post the symmetric Nash
equilibrium bid as an insurance policy before seeing the customer bid, and try to sneak in her
updated bid, hoping that it will go through. However, the customer will try to ¯ght this by
delaying her bid as long as possible.
D. Summary
We now summarize the ¯ndings of the above model in relation to the empirical ¯ndings reported
elsewhere in the paper.
1. Being informed about customer bids gives an advantage to a dealer. This is con¯rmed by our
empirical ¯ndings in Sections 3.A and 3.B. In Section 3.A we establish that dealers modify
their bids on the basis of customer order°ow information. Section 3.B shows the advantage
this gives to the dealers in terms of the accuracy in predicting the primary market clearing
price and ex post pro¯ts.
2. Customers can try to defend themselves against dealers' use of their information by delay-
ing their bids. This can generate the type \last-minute bidding" and \bid-modi¯cation"
behavior we documented in Sections 2, 3 and 4.
3. There are policy implications of this simple model, but these implications should be in-
terpreted cautiously. The main and unambiguous policy implication of the model is that
forcing customers to bid through dealers distorts the e±ciency of the allocation. One may
hope that any such e±ciency losses will be remedied in the secondary market; but this hope
hinges on the lack of transaction costs in the secondary market. The second policy implica-
tion of our simple model is that the e®ect of the current bidding rules on the revenues of the
Government of Canada may depend sensitively on the exact speci¯cation of the model: note
that in the ¯rst example considered above, revenues decreased, but in the second example,
the revenue increased. An accurate characterization of the revenue impact of the current
bidding rules will require the use of a model that provides a much closer approximation to
institutional reality.
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Normalized difference between bid and cutoff price
Dealers w/ Customers Customers
Dealers w/o Customers
"Normalized" difference is equivalent to the (negative) difference of annual yields. See fn. 22, pg.20.
Figure 4: Distribution of Bids Around Cutoff PriceTable 1:  Comparison of the Timing of Dealer vs. Customer Bids 
“Submission time of dealer bid” reports the time, in minutes, before the auction deadline at which the average official dealer bid is submitted. The standard 
deviation is reported in parantheses below. “Submission time of Customer Bid” measures the time, in minutes, before the auction deadline at which the official 
customer bid is submitted. The “paired-difference” is the result of a pairwise t-test between the bid submission time of a dealer and a customer she serves. We 






Maturities      Bills Bonds
Average submission time 
of dealer bids  8.64      9.59 2.27
(min. from deadline)  (7.92)  (8.03)  (2.15) 
      
    
     
   
       
      
     
Average submission time 
of customer bid  9.08  9.71  4.81 
(min. from deadline)  (6.81)  (6.87)  (4.53) 
 
Paired difference between 
dealer-customer bid 
submission time (min.) 
 
-0.43*** -0.12 -2.54***
Std.err. 0.20 0.23  0.29
P-value 0.017 0.3 0
% of times dealer bid  55.29%  52.39%  74.90% 
precedes customer bid 
 
     
Number of comparisons  2042  1779  263 
 Table 2: Do Customer Bids Drive Variation Across Dealers' Bids? 
Each column reports the estimated coefficients from a regression in which the dependent variable is the difference between the dealer's official (quantity 
weighted average price) bid and the cut-off price of the auction. The first independent variable is the difference between this dealer's customers’ bids (averaged 
over customers if the dealer has multiple customers) and the cut-off price of the auction – these bids are observed by the dealer prior to submitting her official 
bid. We also control for the dealers’ net positions, as declared in their official tenders. To purge the effect of the public information content in dealer and 
customer bids, we control for auction and maturity-level fixed effects; thus our estimates reflect within-auction variation across dealers. In the right hand panel, 
we also control for dealer-fixed effects to control for systematic differences in dealers’ bidding behavior. Standard errors are reported below the coefficients. 
Significance at 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels are denoted by (*),(**), and (***). 
 
          (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)
  Entire Sample  T-Bills  Bonds  Entire Sample  T-Bills  Bonds 
Customers’   0.601  0.162  0.620  0.476  0.191  0.418 
Bid (avg. over customers) 
 




       
 
       
   







Dealer’s Net Position    -0.004  -0.001  -0.025   -0.003   -0.0007  -0.016 










Auction Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Maturity Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Dealer Fixed Effects   N  N  N   Y   Y   Y 
Observations 2042 1779 263 2042 1779 263
No. of Auctions  213  153  60  213  153  60 
R-sq overall  0.05  0.07  0.06  0.38  0.23  0.39 




Table 3: Do Modifications in Customer Bids Drive Modifications in Dealer Bids? 
Each column reports the estimated coefficients from a regression in which the dependent variable is the change in a dealer's quantity weighted average bid price 
within the last 10 or 30 minutes before the bid submission deadline. The first independent variable is the change in this dealer's customers' bid prices during the 
last 10 or 30 minutes in the auction. The second independent variable is the change in the dealer's reported net position during the last 10 or 30 minutes of the 
auction. To purge the effect of public information sources in comovements across customer and dealer bid changes, we control for auction and maturity level 
fixed effects in the regressions. We also control for dealer fixed-effects in all specifications. Standard errors are reported below the coefficients. Significance at 
10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels are denoted by (*),(**), and (***). 
 
      
Last 10 Minutes of 
the Auction 
Last 30 Minutes of the 
Auction   
          (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)
  Entire Sample  T-Bills  Bonds  Entire Sample  T-Bills  Bonds 
Change in Customers'  0.261  0.003  0.268  0.135  0.004  0.113 
Bids During Period  (0.029)**  (0.008)  (0.089)***       
           
            
       
 
            
(0.019)*** (0.051) (0.057)**
(basis points, averaged over 
customers) 
Change in Dealer’s Net   0.110  0.00001  1.187   -0.147  -0.0034  -0.157 
Position During Period 
 










Auction Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Maturity Fixed Effects  Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y  
Dealer Fixed Effects  Y   Y   Y   Y   Y   Y  
Observations 1918 1672 246 1909 1667 242
No. of Auctions  213  153  60  213  153  60 
R-sq: overall  0.28  0.03  0.31  0.14  0.01  0.22 
R-sq: within auction  0.36  0.02  0.41  0.19  0.04  0.28 
 Table 4: Access to Customers and Dealers’ Bidding Performance 
The dependent variable in the first three columns is computed by first calculating the absolute deviation of a dealer’s (quantity-weighted average) price bid from 
an auction’s cutoff price. This absolute deviation is then average across securities auctions within a maturity class that the dealer participated in. The first 
independent variable is the average number of customers served by a dealer across auctions within the maturity class. The second independent variable is the log 
of the dealer’s size, measured by the amount of securities demanded by the bidder across auctions within the maturity class. These two independent variables are 
interacted with two indicator variables. The first is an indicator for T-bill auctions. The second is an indicator for dealers who are not primary dealers. The 
coefficients reported are from an OLS regression at the dealer and maturity level, where we also controlled for maturity fixed effects. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses and significance at 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels are denoted by (*),(**), and (***). The dependent variable in the next three columns 
is a measure of the amount of “overbidding” by the dealer. This variable is set equal to the difference between the dealer’s bid and the auction’s cutoff price 
when the dealer’s bid exceeds the cutoff price. It is set equal to zero in auctions where the dealer’s bid is below the cutoff price. The variable is then averaged 
across auctions within a maturity class. The dependent variable for the last three columns of the table is a measure of the amount of “underbidding” by the dealer. 
This variable is set equal to the difference between the dealer’s bid and the auction’s cutoff price when the dealer’s bid is below the cutoff price. It is set equal to 
zero in auctions where the dealer’s bid is above the cutoff price.     
 
   Abs. bid deviation from cutoff price     "Overbids"     "Underbids" 
Average # of customers  -0.077  -0.147  -0.040  0.002  0.001  0.005  -0.079  -0.149  -0.045 
  (0.031)**                  (0.062)** (0.026) (0.008) (0.019) (0.007) (0.032)** (0.064)** (0.030)
log(Dealer size)  0.026  0.033  0.020  -0.002  -0.002  -0.004  0.028  0.035  0.024 
            (0.008)***  (0.016) (0.010)***  (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.007) (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.019)
#customers*T-bill    0.144       -0.001       0.145   
                      (0.062)** (0.019) (0.064)**
log(Dealer size)*T-bill    -0.035       0.002       -0.037   
    (0.010)***       (0.002)       (0.010)***   
#customers*Non-primary dealer      -0.052      -0.004      -0.048 
   (0.093)             (0.028)    (0.104)
log(Dealer size)*Non-primary dealer      0.028      0.004      0.024 
   (0.014)**             (0.007)    (0.016)
Non-primary dealer      -0.435      -0.069      -0.366 
              (0.266)   (0.135)    (0.317)
Observations                    172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172
R-sq (including maturity f. e.)  0.54  0.56  0.57  0.25  0.25  0.26  0.47  0.49  0.50 
  
Table 5: Frequency Distribution of Customers in terms of Average Number of Submitters 
The numbers reported in the table are obtained as follows. Suppose customer ABC participates in 30 year bond auctions, and 1 year treasury bill auctions in the 
sample. We obtain the average number of submitters used by this customer in the 30 year bond auction and the 1 year treasury bill auction. Suppose this average 
3 for the former and 1.25 for the latter auctions. Then customer ABC will appear in row (1) under the ''Treasury Bill'' column, and row (3) under the ''Bonds'' 
column. He is a multiple-submitter customer in bond auctions, and a single-submitter customer in treasury bill auctions.  
 
 
Avg. # of submitters used  Bonds  Treasury Bills  Customer Type 
<1.5        74 95 Single-submitter
>1.5 and < 2.5  18  18  Multiple-submitter 




Table 6: Customers Use Multiple Dealers 
The dependent variable in the reported regressions is the number of submitters used by a customer in an auction. “Bid amount/Issue Amount” is the ratio of the 
total amount bid by a customer in an auction over the amount issued in the auction. “Multiple-Submitter” is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
customer is a multiple-submitter in an auction, and zero otherwise. The sample in columns (1)-(2) consists of official tenders of all customers. The sample in 
column (3) consists of official tenders of all customers in auctions where they submit tenders through two or more dealers. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses, (***) significant at 99%; (**) significant at 95%. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Bid Amount/Issue Amount  2.60  2.53  -3.71 
     
     
     
       
(0.40)***  (1.03)*** (0.41)***
(Bid Amount/Issue Amount)*Bond Auction 
 
  1.69   
(1.01)**
(Bid Amount/Issue Amount)*Multiple Submitter Customer 
 
    5.52 
(1.12)***
Constant   1.32  1.32  2.60 
   (0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.06)*** 
Observations 1413 1413 385
R-squared        0.03 0.03 0.08
 
 Table 7: Customers with Long Term Dealer Relationships 
This table identifies customers who are in long term relationships with dealers. “Maturity-range” identifies the sector (T-bills or Bonds) the relationship is in. We 
also report the percent of bids that a customer routed through her long-term dealer, and the percent of auctions that the customer participated in. 
 
Customer      Maturity  Range Dealer % of bids customer routed 
through dealer 
% of auctions customer 
participated in 
A          T-bill 1 0.782 0.245
B          T-bill 2 0.662 0.217
C          T-bill 3 0.851 0.566
D          T-bill 4 0.778 0.248
E          Bond 2 0.790 0.330
F          Bond 2 0.883 0.286
G          T-bill 4 1 0.229
  
Table 8: Payoffs to Customers with Long Term Dealer Relationships 
The dependent variable in the reported regression is the difference in the quantity weighted average price of an allotted tender (winning bid) and the cutoff price 
in Canadian dollars. Both the quantity weighted average price and the cutoff price are quoted in terms of $CD 100 of the security allotted. The sample for the 
regressions in columns (1)-(3) comprises of allotted tenders of customers who are in a long term relationship, in the sector (bonds or t-bills) where there is a long 
term relationship. The sample for the regressions in columns (4)-(5) is made up of allotted tenders of customers who are in a long-term relationship, submitted 
through the dealer with whom they are in long-term relationship, in the sector in which the customer is in a long-term relationship. As a control group, we also 
include allotted tenders submitted by customers who are not in a long-term relationship. “Use long-term dealer’’ takes the value 1 if a customer in a long-term 
relationship submits the tender through the long-term dealer in the sector where there is a long-term relationship, and 0 otherwise. “Use multiple dealers” is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 for auctions in which the customer is submitting tenders through more than one dealer, possibly including the long-term dealer 
of the customer. “Bond auction” is a dummy variable that takes value if the auction is a bond auction and zero in treasury bill auctions. Standard errors are in 
parentheses above the double lines. (***) significant at 99%; (**) significant at 95%; (*) significant at 90%. 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Use long-term dealer  -0.005  -0.010  0.08  0.005  0.053 
       
          
         
         
         
       
           
           
(0.004)  (0.0016)** (0.005)**  (0.007)*** (0.02)
Use multiple dealers    0.028  -0.03     
(0.008)*** (0.01)
Use long-term dealer * Use multiple dealers 
 
  0.001  0.03     
(0.004) (0.001)***
Bond auction * Use long-term dealer * Use multiple dealers  
 
  0.001     
(0.004)




Constant 0.013 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.007) 
Observations 196 196 196 896 896
R-squared        0.08 0.1  0.01 0.2  0.08
 